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Abstract
Noninterference is a popular semantic security condition because it offers strong end-to-end guaran-
tees, it is inherently compositional, and it can be enforced using a simple security type system. Unfor-
tunately, it is too restrictive for real systems. Mechanisms for downgrading information are needed to
capture real-world security requirements, but downgrading eliminates the strong compositional security
guarantees of noninterference.
We introduce nonmalleable information flow, a new formal security condition that generalizes non-
interference to permit controlled downgrading of both confidentiality and integrity. While previous work
on robust declassification prevents adversaries from exploiting the downgrading of confidentiality, our
key insight is transparent endorsement, a mechanism for downgrading integrity while defending against
adversarial exploitation. Robust declassification appeared to break the duality of confidentiality and
integrity by making confidentiality depend on integrity, but transparent endorsement makes integrity de-
pend on confidentiality, restoring this duality. We show how to extend a security-typed programming
language with transparent endorsement and prove that this static type system enforces nonmalleable
information flow, a new security property that subsumes robust declassification and transparent endorse-
ment. Finally, we describe an implementation of this type system in the context of Flame, a flow-limited
authorization plugin for the Glasgow Haskell Compiler.
1 Introduction
An ongoing foundational challenge for computer security is to discover rigorous—yet sufficiently flexible—
ways to specify what it means for a computing system to be secure. Such security conditions should be
extensional, meaning that they are based on the externally observable behavior of the system rather than
on unobservable details of its implementation. To allow security enforcement mechanisms to scale to large
systems, a security condition should also be compositional, so that secure subsystems remain secure when
combined into a larger system.
Noninterference, along with many variants [18, 34], has been a popular security condition precisely
because it is both extensional and compositional. Noninterference forbids all flows of information from
“high” to “low”, or more generally, flows of information that violate a lattice policy [13].
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Unfortunately, noninterference is also known to be too restrictive for most real systems, which need
fine-grained control over when and how information flows. Consequently, most implementations of infor-
mation flow control introduce downgrading mechanisms to allow information to flow contrary to the lattice
policy. Downgrading confidentiality is called declassification, and downgrading integrity—that is, treating
information as more trustworthy than information that has influenced it—is known as endorsement [46].
Once downgrading is permitted, noninterference is lost. The natural question is whether downgrading
can nevertheless be constrained to guarantee that systems still satisfy some meaningful, extensional, and
compositional security conditions. This paper shows how to constrain the use of both declassification and
endorsement in a way that ensures such a security condition holds.
Starting with the work of Biba [7], integrity has often been viewed as dual to confidentiality. Over
time, that simple duality has eroded. In particular, work on robust declassification [6, 10, 26, 45, 46] has
shown that in the presence of declassification, confidentiality depends on integrity. It is dangerous to give
the adversary the ability to influence declassification, either by affecting the data that is declassified or by
affecting the decision to perform declassification. By preventing such influence, robust declassification stops
the adversary from laundering confidential data through existing declassification operations. Operationally,
languages prevent laundering by restricting declassification to high integrity program points. Robust declas-
sification can be enforced using a modular type system and is therefore compositional.
This paper introduces a new security condition, transparent endorsement, which is dual to robust de-
classification: it controls endorsement by using confidentiality to limit the possible relaxations of integrity.
Transparent endorsement prevents an agent from endorsing information that the provider of the information
could not have seen. Such endorsement is dangerous because it permits the provider to affect flows from
the endorser’s own secret information into trusted information. This restriction on endorsement enforces an
often-implicit justification for endorsing untrusted inputs in high-integrity, confidential computation (e.g.,
a password checker): low-integrity inputs chosen by an attacker should be chosen without knowledge of
secret information.
A similar connection between the confidentiality and integrity of information arises in cryptographic
settings. A malleable encryption scheme is one where a ciphertext encrypting one value can be transformed
into a ciphertext encrypting a related value. While sometimes malleability is intentional (e.g., homomor-
phic encryption), an attacker’s ability to generate ciphertexts makes malleable encryption insufficient to
authenticate messages or validate integrity. Nonmalleable encryption schemes [14] prevent such attacks. In
this paper, we combine robust declassification and transparent endorsement into a new security condition,
nonmalleable information flow, which prevents analogous attacks in an information flow control setting.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We give example programs showing the need for a security condition that controls endorsement of
secret information.
• We generalize robust declassification to programs including complex data structures with heteroge-
neously labeled data.
• We identify transparent endorsement and nonmalleable information flow, new extensional security
conditions for programs including declassification and endorsement.
• We present a core language, NMIFC, which provably enforces robust declassification, transparent
endorsement, and nonmalleable information flow.
• We present the first formulation of robust declassification as a 4-safety hyperproperty, and define two
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new 4-safety hyperproperties for transparent endorsement and nonmalleable information flow, the first
time information security conditions have been characterized as k-safety hyperproperties with k ą 2.
• We describe our implementation of NMIFC using Flame, a flow-limited authorization library for
Haskell and adapt an example of the Servant web application framework, accessible online at http:
//memo.flow.limited.
We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 provides examples of vulnerabilities in prior work. Section 3
reviews relevant background. Section 4 introduces our approach for controlling dangerous endorsements,
and Section 5 presents a syntax, semantics, and type system for NMIFC. Section 6 formalizes our security
conditions and Section 7 restates them as hyperproperties. Section 8 discusses our Haskell implementation,
Section 9 compares our approach to related work, and Section 10 concludes.
2 Motivation
To motivate the need for an additional security condition and give some intuition about transparent endorse-
ment, we give three short examples. Each example shows code that type-checks under existing information-
flow type systems even though it contains insecure information flows, which we are able to characterize in
a new way.
These examples use the notation of the flow-limited authorization model (FLAM) [4], which offers an
expressive way to state both information flow restrictions and authorization policies. However, the problems
observed in these examples are not specific to FLAM; they arise in all previous information-flow models
that support downgrading (e.g., [8, 15, 21, 25, 32, 42, 47]). The approach in this paper can be applied
straightforwardly to the decentralized label model (DLM) [25], and with more effort, to DIFC models that
are less similar to FLAM. While some previous models lack a notion of integrity, from our perspective they
are even worse off, because they effectively allow unrestricted endorsement.
In FLAM, principals and information flow labels occupy the same space. Given a principal (or label)
p, the notation pÑ denotes the confidentiality projection of p, whereas the notation pÐ denotes its integrity
projection. Intuitively, pÑ represents the authority to decide where p’s secrets may flow to, whereas pÐ
represents the authority to decide where information trusted by p may flow from. Robust declassification
ensures that the label pÑ can be removed via declassification only in code that is trusted by p; that is, with
integrity pÐ.
Information flow policies provide a means to specify security requirements for a program, but not an
enforcement mechanism. For example, confidentiality policies might be implemented using encryption and
integrity policies using digital signatures. Alternatively, hardware security mechanisms such as memory
protection might be used to prevent untrusted processes from reading confidential data. The following
examples illustrate issues that would arise in many information flow control systems, regardless of the
enforcement mechanism.
2.1 Fooling a password checker
Password checkers are frequently used as an example of necessary and justifiable downgrading. However,
incorrect downgrading can allow an attacker who does not know the password to authenticate anyway.
Suppose there are two principals, a fully trusted principal T and an untrusted principal U . The following
information flows are then secure: UÑ Ď TÑ and TÐ Ď UÐ. Figure 1 shows in pseudo-code how we
3
1 StringT password;
2
3 booleanTÐ check_password(StringTÑ guess) {
4 booleanT endorsed_guess = endorse(guess, T);
5 booleanT result = (endorsed_guess == password);
6 return declassify(result, TÐ);
7 }
Figure 1: A password checker with malleable information flow
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Figure 2: Cheating in a sealed-bid auction. Without knowing Alice’s bid, Bob can always win by setting b bid :=
a bid + 1
might erroneously implement a password checker in a security-typed language like Jif [24]. Because this
pseudo-code would satisfy the type system, it might appear to be secure.
The argument guess has no integrity because it is supplied by an untrusted, possibly adversarial source.
It is necessary to declassify the result of the function (at line 6) because the result indeed leaks a little
information about the password. Robust declassification, as enforced in Jif, demands that the untrusted
guess be endorsed before it can influence information released by declassification.
Unfortunately, the check_password policy does not prevent faulty or malicious (but well-typed) code
from supplying password directly as the argument, thereby allowing an attacker with no knowledge of the
correct password to “authenticate.” Because guess is labeled as secret (TÑ), a flow of information from
password to guess looks secure to the type system, so this severe vulnerability could remain undetected.
To fix this we would need to make guess less secret, but no prior work has defined rules that would require
this change. The true insecurity, however, lies on line 4, which erroneously treats sensitive information as if
the attacker had constructed it. We can prevent this insecurity by outlawing such endorsements.
2.2 Cheating in a sealed-bid auction
Imagine that two principals A and B (Alice and Bob) are engaging in a two-party sealed-bid auction admin-
istered by an auctioneer T whom they both trust. Such an auction might be implemented using cryptographic
commitments and may even simulate T without need of an actual third party. However, we abstractly spec-
ify the information security requirements that such a scheme would aim to satisfy. Consider the following
sketch of an auction protocol, illustrated in Figure 2:
1. A sends her bid a_bid to T with label AÐ ^ pA ^ BqÑ. This label means a_bid is trusted only by
those who trust A and can be viewed only if both A and B agree to release it.
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2. T accepts a_bid from A and uses his authority to endorse the bid to label pA ^ BqÐ ^ pA ^ BqÑ
(identically, A ^ B). The endorsement prevents any further unilateral modification to the bid by A. T
then broadcasts this endorsed a_bid to A and B. This broadcast corresponds to an assumption that
network messages can be seen by all parties.
3. B constructs b_bid with label BÐ ^ pA^BqÑ and sends it to T .
4. T endorses b_bid to A^B and broadcasts the result.
5. T now uses its authority to declassify both bids and send them to all parties. Since both bids have high
integrity, this declassification is legal according to existing typing rules introduced to enforce (qualified)
robust declassification [4, 10, 26].
Unfortunately, this protocol is subject to attacks analogous to mauling in malleable cryptographic schemes [14]:
B can always win the auction with the minimal winning bid. In Step 3 nothing preventsB from constructing
b_bid by adding 1 to a_bid, yielding a new bid with label BÐ ^ pA^BqÑ (to modify the value, B must
lower the value’s integrity as A did not authorize the modification).
Again an insecurity stems from erroneously endorsing overly secret information. In step 4, T should not
endorse b_bid since it could be based on confidential information inaccessible to B—in particular, a_bid.
The problem can be fixed by givingA’s bid the labelAÑ^AÐ (identically, justA), but existing information
flow systems impose no such requirement.
2.3 Laundering secrets
Wittbold and Johnson [43] present an interesting but insecure program:
1 while (true) do {
2 x = 0 rs x = 1; // generate secret probabilistically
3 output x to H;
4 input y from H; // implicit endorsement
5 output x ‘ (y mod 2) to L
6 }
In this code, there are two external agents, H and L. Agent H is intended to have access to secret
information, whereas L is not. The code generates a secret by assigning to the variable x a nondeterministic,
secret value that is either 0 or 1. The choice of x is assumed not to be affected by the adversary. Its value is
used as a one-time pad to conceal the secret low bit of variable y.
Wittbold and Johnson observe that this code permits an adversary to launder one bit of another secret
variable z by sending z‘x as the value read into y. The low bit of z is then the output to L.
Let us consider this classic example from the viewpoint of a modern information-flow type system
that enforces robust declassification. In order for this code to type-check, it must declassify the value
x‘(y mod 2). Since the attack depends on y being affected by adversarial input from H , secret input
from H must be low-integrity (that is, its label must be HÑ). But if it is low-integrity, this input (or the
variable y) must be endorsed to allow the declassification it influences. As in the previous two examples,
the endorsement of high-confidentiality information enables exploits.
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3 Background
We explore nonmalleable information flow in the context of a simplified version of FLAM [4], so we first
present some background. FLAM provides a unified model for reasoning about both information flow
and authorization. Unlike in previous models, principals and information flow labels in FLAM are drawn
from the same set L. The interpretation of a label as a principal is the least powerful principal trusted to
enforce that label. The interpretation of a principal as a label is the strongest information security policy
that principal is trusted to enforce. We refer to elements of L as principals or labels depending on whether
we are talking about authorization or information flow.
Labels (and principals) have both confidentiality and integrity aspects. A label (or principal) ` can be
projected to capture just its confidentiality (`Ñ) and integrity (`Ð) aspects.
The information flow ordering Ď on labels (and principals) describes information flows that are secure,
in the direction of increasing confidentiality and decreasing integrity. The orthogonal trust ordering ě on
principals (and labels) corresponds to increasing trustedness and privilege: toward increasing confidentiality
and increasing integrity. We read ` Ď `1 as “` flows to `1”, meaning `1 specifies a policy at least as restrictive
as ` does. We read p ě q as “p acts for q”, meaning that q delegates to p.
The information flow and the trust orderings each define a lattice over L, and these lattices lie intuitively
at right angles to one another. The least trusted and least powerful principal is K, (that is, p ě K for all
principals p), and the most trusted and powerful principal is J (where J ě p for all p). We also assume
there is a set of atomic principals like alice and bob that define their own delegations.
Since the trust ordering defines a lattice, it has meet and join operations. Principal p ^ q is the least
powerful principal that can act for both p and q; conversely, p _ q can act for all principals that both p and
q can act for. The least element in the information flow ordering is JÐ, representing maximal integrity
and minimal confidentiality, whereas the greatest element is JÑ, representing minimal integrity and max-
imal confidentiality. The join and meet operators in the information flow lattice are the usual \ and [,
respectively.
Any principal (label) can be expressed in a normal form pÑ^ qÐ where p and q are CNF formulas over
atomic principals [4]. This normal form allows us to decompose decisions about lattice ordering (in either
lattice) into separate questions regarding the integrity component (p) and the confidentiality component (q).
Lattice operations can be similarly decomposed.
FLAM also introduces the concept of the voice of a label (principal) `, written ∇p`q. Formally, for a
normal-form label ` “ pÑ ^ qÐ, we define voice as follows: ∇ppÑ ^ qÐq fi pÐ.1 A label’s voice
represents the minimum integrity needed to securely declassify data constrained by that label, a restriction
designed to enforce robust declassification.
The Flow-Limited Authorization Calculus (FLAC) [5] previously embedded a simplified version of the
FLAM proof system into a core language for enforcing secure authorization and information flow. FLAC
is an extension of the Dependency Core Calculus (DCC) [1, 3] whose types contain FLAM labels. A
computation is additionally associated with a program-counter label pc which tracks the influences on the
control flow and values that are not explicitly labeled.
In this paper we take a similar approach: NMIFC enforces security policies by performing computation
in a monadic context. As in FLAC, NMIFC includes a pc label. For an ordinary value v, the monadic term
pη` vq signifies that value with the information flow label `. If value v has type τ , the term pη` vq has type
` says τ , capturing the confidentiality and integrity of the information.
1FLAM defines∇ppÑ ^ qÐq “ pÐ^ qÐ, but our simplified definition is sufficient for NMIFC. For clarity, the operator∇ is
always applied to a projected principal.
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Unlike FLAC, NMIFC has no special support for dynamic delegation of authority. Atomic principals
defineL by statically delegating their authority to arbitrary conjunctions and disjunctions of other principals,
and we include traditional declassification and endorsement operations, decl and endorse. We leave to
future work the integration of nonmalleable information flow with secure dynamic delegation.
4 Enforcing nonmalleability
Multiple prior security-typed languages—both functional [5] and imperative [6, 10, 26]—aim to allow some
form of secure downgrading. These languages place no restriction whatsoever on the confidentiality of
endorsed data or the context in which an endorsement occurs. Because of this permissiveness, all three
insecure examples from Section 2 type-check in these languages.
4.1 Robust declassification
Robust declassification prevents adversaries from using declassifications in the program to release informa-
tion that was not intended to be released. The adversary is assumed to be able to observe some state of
the system, whose confidentiality label is sufficiently low, and to modify some state of the system, whose
integrity label is sufficiently low. Semantically, robust declassification says that if the attacker is unable to
learn a secret with one attack, no other attack will cause it to be revealed [26, 45]. The attacker has no con-
trol over information release because all attacks are equally good. When applied to a decentralized system,
robust declassification means that for any principal p, other principals that p does not trust cannot influence
declassification of p’s secrets [10].
To enforce robust declassification, prior security-typed languages place integrity constraints on declassi-
fication. The original work on FLAM enforces robust declassification using the voice operator∇. However,
when declassification is expressed as a programming-language operation, as is more typical, it is convenient
to define a new operator on labels, one that maps in the other direction, from integrity to confidentiality.
We define the view of a principal as the upper bound on the confidentiality a label or context can enforce to
securely endorse that label:
Definition 1 (Principal view). Let ` “ pÑ ^ qÐ be a FLAM label (principal) expressed in normal form.
The view of `, written ∆p`q, is defined as ∆ppÑ ^ qÐq fi qÑ.
When the confidentiality of a label ` lies above the view of its own integrity, a declassification of that
label may give adversaries the opportunity to subvert the declassification to release information. Without
enough integrity, an adversary might, for example, replace the information that is intended to be released
via declassification with some other secret.
Figure 3 illustrates this idea graphically. It depicts the lattice of FLAM labels, which is a product lattice
with two axes, confidentiality and integrity. A given label ` is a point in this diagram, whereas the set of
labels sharing the same confidentiality `Ñ or integrity `Ð correspond to lines on the diagram. Given the
integrity `Ð of the label `, the view of that integrity, ∆p`Ðq, defines a region of information (shaded) that is
too confidential to be declassified.
The view operator directly corresponds to the writers-to-readers operator that Chong and Myers [10]
use to enforce robust declassification in the DLM. We generalize the same idea here to the more expressive
labels of FLAM.
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ℓ←
C
I
⊥ ⊤
⊤→
⊤←
Δ(ℓ←)
nonrobust
robust
Figure 3: Robust declassification says information at level ` can be declassified only if it has enough integrity. The
gray shaded region represents information that ∆p`Ðq cannot read, so it is unsafe to declassify with `’s integrity.
4.2 Transparent endorsement
The key insight of this work is that endorsement should be restricted in a manner dual to robust declassi-
fication; declassification (reducing confidentiality) requires a minimum integrity, so endorsement (raising
integrity) should require a maximum confidentiality. Intuitively, if a principal could have written data it can-
not read, which we call an “opaque write,” it is unsafe to endorse that data. An endorsement is transparent
if it endorses only information its authors could read.
The voice operator suffices to express this new restriction conveniently, as depicted in Figure 4. In
the figure, we consider endorsing information with confidentiality `Ñ. This confidentiality is mapped to
a corresponding integrity level ∇p`Ñq, defining a minimal integrity level that ` must have in order to be
endorsed. If ` lies below this boundary, its endorsement is considered transparent; if it lies above the
boundary, endorsement is opaque and hence insecure. The duality with robust declassification is clear.
5 A core language: NMIFC
We now describe the NonMalleable Information Flow Calculus (NMIFC), a new core language, modeled
on DCC and FLAC, that allows downgrading, but in a more constrained manner than FLAC so as to provide
stronger semantic guarantees. NMIFC incorporates the program-counter label pc of FLAC, but eschews the
more powerful assume mechanism of FLAC in favor of more traditional declassify and endorse operations.
The full NMIFC is a small extension of Polymorphic DCC [1]. In Figure 5 we present the core syntax,
leaving other features such as sums, pairs, and polymorphism to Appendix A. Unlike DCC, NMIFC sup-
ports downgrading and models it as an effect. It is necessary to track what information influences control
flow so that these downgrading effects may be appropriately constrained. Therefore, like FLAC, NMIFC
adds pc labels to lambda terms and types.
Similarly to DCC, protected values have type ` says τ where ` is the confidentiality and integrity of a
8
CI
⊥ ⊤
⊤→
⊤←
l
→
transparent
opaque
∇(ℓ→)
ℓ→
Figure 4: Transparent endorsement in NMIFC. The gray shaded region represents information that ∇p`Ñq does not
trust and may have been created by an opaque write. It is thus unsafe to endorse with `’s confidentiality.
n P N (atomic principals)
x P V (variable names)
pi P tÑ,Ðu (security aspects)
p, `, pc ::“ n ˇˇ J ˇˇ K ˇˇ ppi ˇˇ p^ p ˇˇ p_ p ˇˇ p\ p ˇˇ p[ p
τ ::“ unit ˇˇ τ pcÝÑ τ ˇˇ ` says τ
v ::“ pq ˇˇ λpx :τqrpcs. e ˇˇ pη` vq
e ::“ x ˇˇ v ˇˇ e e ˇˇ pη` eq ˇˇ bind x “ e in eˇˇ
decl e to `
ˇˇ
endorse e to `
Figure 5: Core NMIFC syntax.
value of type τ . All computation on these values occurs in the says monad; protected values must be bound
using the bind term before performing operations on them (e.g., applying them as functions). Results of
such computations are protected with the monadic unit operator pη` eq, which protects the result of e with
label `.
5.1 NMIFC operational semantics
The core semantics of NMIFC are mostly standard, but to obtain our theoretical results we need additional
information about evaluation. This information is necessary because we want to identify, for instance,
whether information is ever available to an attacker during evaluation, even if it is discarded and does not
influence the final result. This approach gives an attacker more power; an attacker can see information at its
level even if it is not output by the program.
The NMIFC semantics, presented in Figure 6, maintain a trace t of events. An event is emitted into
the trace whenever a new protected value is created and whenever a declassification or endorsement occurs.
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e ÝÑ e1
rE-APPs pλpx :τqrpcs. eq v ÝÑ erx ÞÑ vs rE-BINDMs bind x “ pη` vq in e ÝÑ erx ÞÑ vs
(event) c ::“ ‚ ˇˇ pη` vq ˇˇ pÓpi`1 , η` vq
(trace) t ::“ ε ˇˇ c ˇˇ t; t
xe, ty ÝÑ @e1, t1D
rE-STEPs e ÝÑ e
1
xe, ty ÝÑ @e1, t; ‚D rE-UNITMs xpη` vq, ty ÝÑ xpη` vq, t; pη` vqy
rE-DECLs xdecl pη`1 vq to `, ty ÝÑ xpη` vq, t; pÓÑ`1 , η` vqy
rE-ENDORSEs xendorse pη`1 vq to `, ty ÝÑ xpη` vq, t; pÓÐ`1 , η` vqy rE-EVALs
xe, ty ÝÑ @e1, t1D
xEres, ty ÝÑ @Ere1s, t1D
Evaluation context
E ::“ r¨s ˇˇ E e ˇˇ v E ˇˇ pη` Eq ˇˇ bind x “ E in eˇˇ
decl E to `
ˇˇ
endorse E to `
Figure 6: Core NMIFC operational semantics.
These events track the observations or influence an attacker may have during a run of an NMIFC program.
Formally, a trace can be an empty trace ε, a single event c, or the concatenation of two traces with the
associative operator “;” with identity ε.
When a source-level unit term pη` vq is evaluated (rule E-UNITM), an event pη` vq is added to the trace
indicating that the value v became protected at `. When a protected value is declassified, a declassification
event pÓÑ`1 , η` vq is emitted, indicating that v was declassified from `1 to `. Likewise, an endorsement event
pÓÐ`1 , η` vq is emitted for an endorsement. Other evaluation steps (rule E-STEP) emit ‚, for “no event.” Rule
E-EVAL steps under the evaluation contexts [44] defined at the bottom of Figure 6.
Rather than being literal side effects of the program, these events track how observable information is
as it is accessed, processed, and protected by the program. Because our semantics emits an event whenever
information is protected (by evaluating an η term) or downgraded (by a decl or endorse term), our traces
capture all information processed by a program, indexed by the policy protecting that information.
By analogy, these events are similar to the typed and labeled mutable reference cells of languages like
FlowCaml [30] and DynSec [48]. An event pη` vq is analogous to allocating a reference cell protected at `,
and pÓpi`1 , η` vq is analogous to copying the contents of a cell at `1 to a new cell at `.
It is important for the semantics to keep track of these events so that our security conditions hold for
programs containing data structures and higher-order functions. Previous language-based definitions of
robust declassification have only applied to simple while-languages [6, 10, 26] or to primitive types [5].
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$ ` Ď τ
rP-UNITs $ ` Ď unit rP-LBLs `
1 Ď `
$ `1 Ď ` says τ
Figure 7: Type protection levels.
Γ; pc $ e : τ
rVARs Γ, x :τ,Γ1; pc $ x : τ rUNITs Γ; pc $ pq : unit rLAMs Γ, x :τ1; pc
1 $ e : τ2
Γ; pc $ λpx :τ1qrpc1s. e : τ1 pc
1ÝÑ τ2
rAPPs
Γ; pc $ e1 : τ 1 pc
1ÝÑ τ
Γ; pc $ e2 : τ 1 pc Ď pc1
Γ; pc $ e1 e2 : τ rUNITMs
Γ; pc $ e : τ pc Ď `
Γ; pc $ pη` eq : ` says τ
rVUNITMs Γ; pc $ v : τ
Γ; pc $ pη` vq : ` says τ
rBINDMs
Γ; pc $ e : ` says τ 1 $ ` Ď τ
Γ, x :τ 1; pc\ ` $ e1 : τ
Γ; pc $ bind x “ e in e1 : τ
rDECLs
Γ; pc $ e : `1 says τ `1Ð “ `Ð pc Ď `
`1Ñ Ď `Ñ \∆pp`1 \ pcqÐq
Γ; pc $ decl e to ` : ` says τ
rENDORSEs
Γ; pc $ e : `1 says τ `1Ñ “ `Ñ pc Ď `
`1Ð Ď `Ð \∇pp`1 \ pcqÑq
Γ; pc $ endorse e to ` : ` says τ
Figure 8: Typing rules for core NMIFC.
5.2 NMIFC type system
The NMIFC protection relation, presented in Figure 7, defines how types relate to information flow poli-
cies. A type τ protects the confidentiality and integrity of ` if $ ` Ď τ . Unlike in DCC and FLAC, a
label is protected by a type only if it flows to the outermost says principal. In FLAC and DCC, the types
`1 says ` says τ and ` says `1 says τ protect the same set of principals; in other words, says is commu-
tative. By distinguishing between these types, NMIFC does not provide the same commutativity.
The commutativity of says is a design decision, offering a more permissive programming model at the
cost of less precise tracking of dependencies. NMIFC takes advantage of this extra precision in the UNITM
typing rule so the label on every η term protects the information it contains, even if nested within other η
terms. Abadi [2] similarly modifies DCC’s protection relation to distinguish the protection level of terms
with nested says types.
The core type system presented in Figure 8 enforces nonmalleable information flow for NMIFC pro-
grams. Most of the typing rules are standard, and differ only superficially from DCC and FLAC. Like in
FLAC, NMIFC typing judgments include a program counter label, pc, that represents an upper bound on
the confidentiality and integrity of bound information that any computation may depend upon. For instance,
rule BINDM requires the type of the body of a bind term to protect the unlabeled information of type τ 1
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with at least `, and to type-check under a raised program counter label pc \ `. Rule LAM ensures that
function bodies type-check with respect to the function’s pc annotation, and rule APP ensures functions are
only applied in contexts that flow to these annotations.
The NMIFC rule for UNITM differs from FLAC and DCC in requiring the premise pc Ď ` for well-
typed η terms. This premise ensures a more precise relationship between the pc and η terms. Intuitively this
restriction makes sense. The pc is a bound on all unlabeled information in the context. Since an expression
e protected with pη` eq may depend on any of this information, it makes sense to require that pc flow to `.2
By itself, this restrictive premise would prevent public data from flowing through secret contexts and
trusted data from flowing through untrusted contexts. To allow such flows, we distinguish source-level pη` eq
terms from run-time values pη` vq, which have been fully evaluated. These terms are only created by the
operational semantics during evaluation and no longer depend on the context in which they appear; they
are closed terms. Thus it is appropriate to omit the new premise in VUNITM. This approach allows us to
require more precise flow tracking for the explicit dependencies of protected expressions without restricting
where these values flow once they are fully evaluated.
Rule DECL ensures a declassification from label `1 to ` is robust. We first require `1Ð “ `Ð to ensure that
this does not perform endorsement. A more permissive premise `1Ð Ď `Ð is admissible, but requiring equal-
ity simplifies our proofs and does not reduce expressiveness since the declassification can be followed by a
subsequent relabeling. The premise pc Ď ` requires that declassifications occur in high-integrity contexts,
and prevents declassification events from creating implicit flows. The premise `1Ñ Ď `Ñ \∆pp`1 \ pcqÐq
ensures that the confidentiality of the information declassified does not exceed the view of the integrity of
the principals that may have influenced it. These influences can be either explicit (`1Ð) or implicit (pcÐ), so
we compare against the join of the two.3 This last premise effectively combines the two conditions identified
by Chong and Myers [10] for enforcing robust declassification in an imperative while-language.
Rule ENDORSE enforces transparent endorsement. All but the last premise are straightforward: the
expression does not declassify and pc Ď ` requires a high-integrity context to endorse and prevents implicit
flows. Interestingly, the last premise is dual to that in DECL. An endorsement cannot raise integrity above
the voice of the confidentiality of the data being endorsed (`1Ñ) or the context performing the endorsement
(pcÑ). For the same reasons as in DECL, we compare against their join.
5.3 Examples revisited
We now reexamine the examples presented in Section 2 to see that the NMIFC type system prevents the
vulnerabilities seen above.
5.3.1 Password checker
We saw above that when the password checker labels guess at TÑ, well-typed code can improperly set
guess to the actual password. We noted that the endorsement enabled an insecure flow of information.
Looking at ENDORSE in NMIFC, we can attempt to type the equivalent expression: endorse guess to T .
However, if guess has type TÑ says bool, the endorse does not type-check; it fails to satisfy the final
premise of ENDORSE:
KÐ “ pTÑqÐ ­Ď TÐ \∇pTÑq “ TÐ.
2The premise is not required in FLAC because protection is commutative. For example, in a FLAC term such as bind x “
v in pη`1 pη` xqq, x may be protected by ` or `1.
3 The first two premises—`1Ð “ `Ð and pc Ď `—make this join redundant. It would, however, be necessary if we replaced the
equality premise with the more permissive `1Ð Ď `Ð version, so we include it for clarity.
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checkpwd “ λpg :UÐ says String, p :T says StringqrTÐs.
bind guess “ pendorse g to TÐq in
decl pbind pwd “ p in pηT pwd ““ guessqq to TÐ
Figure 9: A secure version of a password checker.
If we instead give guess the label UÐ, the endorsement type-checks, assuming a sufficiently trusted pc.
This is as it should be. With the label UÐ, the guesser must be able to read their own guess, guaranteeing
that they cannot guess the correct password unless they in fact know the correct password. Figure 9 shows
this secure version of the password checker.
5.3.2 Sealed-bid auction
In the insecure auction described in Section 2.2, we argued that an insecure flow was created when T en-
dorsed b_bid fromBÐ^pA^BqÑ toA^B. This endorsement requires a term of the form endorse v toA^B
where v types to BÐ ^ pA ^ BqÑ says int. Despite the trusted context, the last premise of ENDORSE
again fails:
BÐ ­Ď pA^BqÐ \∇ppA^BqÑq “ pA^BqÐ.
If we instead label a bid : A says int and b bid : B says int, then the corresponding endorse state-
ments type-check, assuming that T is trusted: T Ď pA^BqÐ.
5.3.3 Laundering secrets
For the secret-laundering example in Section 2.3, we assume that neither H nor L is trusted, but the output
from the program is. This forces an implicit endorsement of y, the input received from H . But the condition
needed to endorse from HÑ ^KÐ to HÑ ^JÐ is false:
KÐ Ď JÐ \∇pHÑq “ ∇pHÑq
We have ∇pLÑq ­Ď ∇pHÑq and all integrity flows to KÐ, so by transitivity the above condition cannot
hold.
6 Security conditions
The NMIFC typing rules enforce several strong security conditions: multiple forms of conditional nonin-
terference, robust declassification, and our new transparent endorsement and nonmalleable information flow
conditions. We define these conditions formally but relegate proof details to Appendix D.
6.1 Attackers
Noninterference is frequently stated with respect to a specific but arbitrary label. Anything below that label
in the lattice is “low” (public or trusted) and everything else is “high”. We broaden this definition slightly
and designate high information using a set of labels H that is upward closed. That is, if ` P H and ` Ď `1,
then `1 P H. We refer to such upward closed sets as high sets.
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c «W c1 v «W v1
These equivalence relations are the smallest congruences over c and over v extended with ‚, containing the
equivalences defined by these rules:
rEQ-UNITMs ` RWpη` vq «W ‚
rEQ-DOWNs ` RWpÓpi`1 , η` vq «W ‚
t «‹W t1
The equivalence relation t «‹W t1 is the smallest congruence over t containing the equivalences defined by these
rules:
rT-LIFTs c «W c
1
c «‹W c1
rT-BULLETRs t; ‚ «‹W t rT-BULLETLs ‚; t «‹W t
Figure 10: Low equivalence and low trace equivalence.
We say that a type τ is a high type, written “$ τ protH”, if all of the information in a value of type τ is
above some label in the high setH. The following rule defines high types:
rP-SETs H P H $ H Ď τ$ τ protH H is upward closed
This formulation of adversarial power is adequate to express noninterference, in which confidentiality
and integrity do not interact. However, our more complex conditions relate confidentiality to integrity and
therefore require a way to relate the attacker’s power in the two domains.
Intuitively, an attacker is an arbitrary set of colluding atomic principals. Specifically, if n1, . . . , nk P N
are those atomic principals, then the set A “ t` P L | n1 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ nk ě `u represents this attacker’s power.
These principals may include principals mentioned in the program, and there may be delegations between
attacker principals and program principals. While this definition of an attacker is intuitive, the results in this
paper actually hold for a more general notion of attacker defined in Appendix B.
Attackers correspond to two high sets: an untrusted high set U “ t` P L | `Ð P Au and a secret high
set S “ t` P L | `Ñ R Au. We say that A induces U and S.
6.2 Equivalences
All of our security conditions involve relations on traces. As is typically the case for information-flow
security conditions, we define a notion of “low equivalence” on traces, which ignores effects with high
labels. We proceed by defining low-equivalent expressions and then extending low-equivalence to traces.
For expression equivalence, we examine precisely the values which are visible to a low observer defined
by a set of labels W: pη` vq and pÓpi`1 , η` vq where ` P W . We formalize this idea in Figure 10, using‚ to represent values that are not visible. Beyond ignoring values unable to affect the output, we use a
standard structural congruence (i.e., syntactic equivalence). This strict notion of equivalence is not entirely
necessary; observational equivalence or any refinement thereof would be sufficient if augmented with the
‚-equivalences in Figure 10.
Figure 10 also extends the equivalence on emitted values to equivalence on entire traces of emitted
values. Essentially, two traces are equivalent if there is a way to match up equivalent events in each trace,
while ignoring high events equivalent to ‚.
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6.3 Noninterference and downgrading
An immediate consideration when formalizing information flow is how to express interactions between an
adversary and the system. One possibility is to limit interaction to inputs and outputs of the program. This is
a common approach for functional languages. We take a stronger approach in which security is expressed in
terms of execution traces. Note that traces contain all information necessary to ensure the security of input
and output values.
We begin with a statement of noninterference in the presence of downgrading. Theorem 1 states that,
given two high inputs, a well-typed program produces two traces that are either low-equivalent or contain
a downgrade event that distinguishes them. This implies that differences in traces distinguishable by an
attacker are all attributable to downgrades of information derived from the high inputs. Furthermore, any
program that performs no downgrades on secret or untrusted values (i.e., contain no decl or endorse terms
onH data) must be noninterfering.
Theorem 1 (Noninterference modulo downgrading). Let H be a high set and let W “ LzH. Given an
expression e such that Γ, x :τ1; pc $ e : τ2 where $ τ1 protH, for all v1, v2 with Γ; pc $ vi : τ1, if
xerx ÞÑ vis, viy ÝÑ˚
@
v1i, ti
D
then either there is some event pÓpi`1 , η` wq P ti where `1 P H and ` R H, or t1 «‹W t2.
The restrictions placed on downgrading operations mean that we can characterize the conditions under
which no downgrading can occur. We add two further noninterference theorems that restrict downgrading in
different ways. Theorem 2 states that if a program types without a public–trusted pc it must be noninterfering
(with respect to that definition of “public–trusted”).
Theorem 2 (Noninterference of high-pc programs). Let A be an attacker inducing high sets U and S. Let
H be one of those high sets andW “ LzH. Given some e such that Γ, x :τ1; pc $ e : τ2 where$ τ1 protH,
for all v1, v2 with Γ; pc $ vi : τ1, if xerx ÞÑ vis, viy ÝÑ˚ xv1i, tiy and pc P U Y S, then t1 «‹W t2.
Rather than restrict the pc, Theorem 3 states that secret–untrusted information is always noninterfering.
Previous work (e.g., [6, 26]) does not restrict endorsement of confidential information, allowing any label
to be downgraded to public–trusted (given a public–trusted pc). In NMIFC, however, secret–untrusted data
must remain secret and untrusted.
Theorem 3 (Noninterference of secret–untrusted data). Let A be an attacker inducing high sets U and S .
Let H “ U X S andW “ LzH. Given some e such that Γ, x :τ1; pc $ e : τ2 where $ τ1 protH, for all
v1, v2 with Γ; pc $ vi : τ1, if xerx ÞÑ vis, viy ÝÑ˚ xv1i, tiy then t1 «‹W t2.
6.4 Robust declassification and irrelevant inputs
We now move to security conditions for programs that do not satisfy noninterference. Recall that robust
declassification informally means the attacker has no influence on what information is released by declassi-
fication. Traditionally, it is stated in terms of attacker-provided code that is inserted into low-integrity holes
in programs which differ only in their secret inputs. In NMIFC, the same attacker power can be obtained
by substituting exactly two input values into the program, one secret and one untrusted. This simplification
is possible because NMIFC has first-class functions that can model the substitution of low-integrity code.
Appendix C shows that this simpler two-input definition is equivalent to the traditional hole-based approach
in the full version of NMIFC (Appendix A).
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`
λpx : pPÑ ^ UÐ says τq ˆ pPÑ ^ UÐ says τqqrPÑ ^ TÐs.
decl
`
bind b “ pηSÑ^TÐ secq in
case b of inj1 .pηSÑ^TÐ pproj1 xqq
| inj2 .pηSÑ^TÐ pproj2 xqq
˘
to PÑ ^ TÐ˘ @atk1, atk2D
Figure 11: A program that admits inept attacks. Here P Ď S and T Ď U , but not vice versa, so sec is a secret boolean
and xatk1, atk2y form an untrusted pair of values. If atk1 ‰ atk2, then the attacker will learn the value of sec. If
atk1 “ atk2, however, then the attacker learns nothing due to its own ineptness.
Prior work on while-based languages [10, 26] define robust declassification in terms of four traces gen-
erated by the combination of two variations: a secret input and some attacker-supplied code. For terminating
traces, these definitions require any pair of secrets to produce public-equivalent traces under all attacks or
otherwise to produce distinguishable traces regardless of the attacks chosen. This implies that an attacker
cannot control the disclosure of secrets.
We can attempt to capture this notion of robust declassifcation using the notation of NMIFC. For a
program e with a secret input x and untrusted input y, we wish to say e robustly declassifies if, for all secret
values v1, v2 and for all untrusted values w1, w2, where
xerx ÞÑ visry ÞÑ wjs, vi;wjy ÝÑ˚
@
vij , t
ij
D
,
then t11 «‹P t21 ðñ t12 «‹P t22.
This condition is intuitive but, unfortunately, overly restrictive. It does not account for the possibility of
an inept attack, in which an attacker causes a program to reveal less information than intended.
Inept attacks are harder to characterize than in previous work because, unlike the previously used while-
languages, NMIFC supports data structures with heterogeneous labels. Using such data structures, we can
build a program that implicitly declassifies data by using a secret to influence the selection of an attacker-
provided value and then declassifying that selection. Figure 11 provides an example of such a program,
which uses sums and products from the full NMIFC language.
While this program appears secure—the attacker has no control over what information is declassified
or when a declassification occurs—it violates the above condition. One attack can contain the same value
twice—causing any two secrets to produce indistinguishable traces—while the other can contain different
values. Intuitively, no vulnerability in the program is thereby revealed; the program was intended to release
information, but the attacker failed to infer it due to a poor choice of attack. Such inputs result in less
information leakage entirely due to the attacker’s ineptness, not an insecurity of the program. As a result,
we consider inputs from inept attackers to be irrelevant to our security conditions.
Dually to inept attackers, we can define uninteresting secret inputs. For example, if a program endorses
an attacker’s selection of a secret value, an input where all secret options contain the same data is uninter-
esting, so we also consider it irrelevant.
Which inputs are irrelevant is specific to the program and to the choice of attacker. In Figure 11, if
both execution paths used pproj1 xq, there would be no way for an attacker to learn any information, so all
attacks are equally relevant. Similarly, if SÑ is already considered public, then there is no secret information
in the first place, so again, all attacks are equally relevant.
For an input to be irrelevant, it must have no influence over the outermost layer of the data structure—
the label that is explicitly downgraded. If the input could influence that outer layer in any way, the internal
data could be an integral part of an insecure execution. Conversely, when the selection of nested values
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is independent of any untrusted/secret information (though the content of the values may not be), it is
reasonable to assume that the inputs will be selected so that different choices yield different results. An
input which does not is either an inept attack—an attacker gaining less information than it could have—or
an uninteresting secret—a choice between secrets that are actually the same. In either case, the input is
irrelevant.
To ensure that we only consider data structures with nested values that were selected independently
of the values themselves, we leverage the noninterference theorems in Section 6.3. In particular, if the
outermost label is trusted before a declassification (or public prior to an endorsement), then any influence
from untrusted (secret) data must be the result of a prior explicit downgrade. Thus we can identify irrelevant
inputs by finding inputs that result in traces that are public-trusted equivalent, but can be made both public
(trusted) equivalent and non-equivalent at the point of declassification (endorsement).
To define this formally, we begin by partitioning the principal lattice into four quadrants using the defini-
tion of an attacker from Section 6.1. We consider only flows between quadrants and, as with noninterference,
downgrades must result in public or trusted values. We additionally need to refer to individual elements and
prefixes of traces. For a trace t, let tn denote the nth element of t, and let t..n denote the prefix of t containing
its first n elements.
Definition 2 (Irrelevant inputs). Consider attacker A inducing high sets HÐ and HÑ. Let Wpi “ LzHpi
and W “ WÐ XWÑ. Given opposite projections pi and pi1 a program e, and types τx and τy such that
$ τx protHpi and $ τy protHpi1 , we say an input v1 is an irrelevant pi1-input with respect to A and e if
Γ; pc $ v1 : τx and there exist values v2, w1, and w2 and four trace indices nij (for i, j P t1, 2u) such that
the following conditions hold:
1. Γ; pc $ v2 : τx, Γ; pc $ w1 : τy, and Γ; pc $ w2 : τy
2. xerx ÞÑ visry ÞÑ wjs, vi;wjy ÝÑ˚ xvij , tijy
3. tijnij ffW ‚ for all i, j P t1, 2u
4. tij..nij «‹W tkl..nkl for all i, j, k, l P t1, 2u
5. t11..n11 «‹Wpi t12..n12
6. t21..n21 ff‹Wpi t22..n22
Otherwise we say v1 is a relevant pi1-input with respect to A and e, denoted relpi1A,epv1q. Note that the four
indices nij identify corresponding prefixes of the four traces.
As mentioned above, prior downgrades can allow secret/untrusted information to directly influence the
outer later of the data structure, but Condition 4 requires that all four trace prefixes be public-trusted equiv-
alent, so any such downgrades must have the same influence across all executions. Condition 5 requires that
some inputs result in prefixes that are public equivalent (or trusted equivalent for endorsement), while Condi-
tion 6 requires that other inputs result in prefixes that are distinguishable. Since all prefixes are public-trusted
equivalent, this means there is an implicit downgrade inside a data structure, so the equivalent prefixes form
an irrelevant input.
We can now relax our definition of robust declassification to only restrict the behavior of relevant inputs.
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Definition 3 (Robust declassification). Let e be a program and let x and y be variables representing secret
and untrusted inputs, respectively. We say that e robustly declassifies if, for all attackers A inducing high
sets U and S (and P “ LzS) and all values v1, v2, w1, w2, if
xerx ÞÑ visry ÞÑ wjs, vi;wjy ÝÑ˚
@
vij , t
ij
D
,
then
`
relÐA,epw1q and t11 «‹P t21
˘ ùñ t12 «‹P t22.
As NMIFC only restricts declassification of low-integrity data, endorsed data is free to influence future
declassifications. As a result, we can only guarantee robust declassification in the absence of endorsements.
Theorem 4 (Robust declassification). Given a program e, if Γ, x :τx, y :τy; pc $ e : τ and e contains no
endorse expressions, then e robustly declassifies as defined in Definition 3.
Note that prior definitions of robust declassification [10, 26] similarly prohibit endorsement and ig-
nore pathological inputs, specifically nonterminating traces. Our irrelevant inputs are very different since
NMIFC is strongly normalizing but admits complex data structures, but the need for some restriction is not
new.
6.5 Transparent endorsement
We described in Section 2 how endorsing opaque writes can create security vulnerabilities. To formalize
this intuition, we present transparent endorsement, a security condition that is dual to robust declassification.
Instead of ensuring that untrusted information cannot meaningfully influence declassification, transparent
endorsement guarantees that secret information cannot meaningfully influence endorsement. This guarantee
ensures that secrets cannot influence the endorsement of an attacker’s value—neither the value endorsed nor
the existence of the endorsement itself.
As it is completely dual to robust declassification, we again appeal to the notion of irrelevant inputs, this
time to rule out uninteresting secrets. The condition looks nearly identical, merely switching the roles of
confidentiality and integrity. It therefore ensures that any choice of interesting secret provides an attacker
with the maximum possible ability to influence endorsed values; no interesting secrets provide more power
to attackers than others.
Definition 4 (Transparent endorsement). Let e be a program and let x and y be variables representing secret
and untrusted inputs, respectively. We say that e transparently endorses if, for all attackers A inducing high
sets U and S (and T “ LzU) and all values v1, v2, w1, w2, if
xerx ÞÑ visry ÞÑ wjs, vi;wjy ÝÑ˚
@
vij , t
ij
D
,
then
`
relÑA,epv1q and t11 «‹T t12
˘ ùñ t21 «‹T t22.
As in robust declassification, we can only guarantee transparent endorsement in the absence of declassi-
fication.
Theorem 5 (Transparent endorsement). Given a program e, if Γ, x :τx, y :τy; pc $ e : τ and e contains no
decl expressions, then e transparently endorses.
18
6.6 Nonmalleable information flow
Robust declassification and transparent endorsement each restrict one type of downgrading, but as struc-
tured above, cannot be enforced in the presence of both declassification and endorsement. The key difficulty
stems from the fact that previously declassified and endorsed data should be able to influence future declas-
sifications and endorsements. However, any endorsement allows an attack to influence declassification, so
varying the secret input can cause the traces to deviate for one attack and not another. Similarly, once a
declassification has occurred, we can say little about the relation between trace pairs that fix a secret and
vary an attack.
There is one condition that allows us to safely relate trace pairs even after a downgrade event: if the
downgraded values are identical in both trace pairs. Even if a declassify or endorse could have caused
the traces to deviate, if it did not, then this program is essentially the same as one that started with that
value already downgraded and performed no downgrade. To capture this intuition, we define nonmalleable
information flow in terms of trace prefixes that either do not deviate in public values when varying only
the secret input or do not deviate in trusted values when varying only the untrusted input. This assumption
may seem strong at first, but it exactly captures the intuition that downgraded data—but not secret/untrusted
data—should be able to influence future downgrades. While two different endorsed attacks could influence
a future declassification, if the attacks are similar enough to result in the same value being endorsed, they
must influence the declassification in the same way.
Definition 5 (Nonmalleable information flow). Let e be a program and let x and y be variables representing
secret and untrusted inputs, respectively. We say that e enforces nonmalleable information flow (NMIF)
if the following holds for all attackers A inducing high sets U and S. Let T “ LzU , P “ LzS and
W “ T X S . For all values v1, v2, w1, and w2, let
xerx ÞÑ visry ÞÑ wjs, vi;wjy ÝÑ˚
@
vij , t
ij
D
.
For all indices nij such that t
ij
nij ffW ‚
1. If ti1..ni1´1 «‹T ti2..ni2´1 for i “ 1, 2, then`
relÐA,epw1q and t11..n11 «‹P t21..n21
˘ ùñ t12..n12 «‹P t22..n22 .
2. Similarly, if t1j..n1j´1 «‹P t2j..n2j´1 for j “ 1, 2, then`
relÑA,epv1q and t11..n11 «‹T t12..n12
˘ ùñ t21..n21 «‹T t22..n22 .
Unlike the previous conditions, NMIFC enforces NMIF with no syntactic restrictions.
Theorem 6 (Nonmalleable information flow). For any program e such that Γ, x :τx, y :τy; pc $ e : τ , e
enforces NMIF.
We note that both Theorems 4 and 5 are directly implied by Theorem 6. For robust declassification, the
syntactic prohibition on endorse directly enforces ti1 «‹T ti2 (for the entire trace), and the rest of case 1 is
exactly that of Theorem 4. Similarly, the syntactic prohibition on decl enforces t1j «‹P t2j , while the rest
of case 2 is exactly Theorem 5.
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7 NMIF as 4-safety
Clarkson and Schneider [12] define a hyperproperty as “a set of sets of infinite traces,” and hypersafety to
be a hyperproperty that can be characterized by a finite set of finite trace prefixes defining some “bad thing.”
That is, given any of these finite sets of trace prefixes it is impossible to extend those traces to satisfy the
hyperproperty. It is therefore possible to show that a program satisfies a hypersafety property by proving
that no set of finite trace prefixes emitted by the program fall into this set of “bad things.” They further
define a k-safety hyperproperty (or k-safety) as a hypersafety property that limits the set of traces needed to
identify a violation to size k.
Clarkson and Schneider note that noninterference provides an example of 2-safety. We demonstrate here
that robust declassification, transparent endorsement, and nonmalleable information flow are all 4-safety
properties.4
For a condition to be 2-safety, it must be possible to demonstrate a violation using only two finite
traces. With noninterference, this demonstration is simple: if two traces with low-equivalent inputs are
distinguishable by a low observer, the program is interfering.
Robust declassification, however, cannot be represented this way. It says that the program’s confidential-
ity release events cannot be influence by untrusted inputs. If we could precisely identify the release events,
this would allow us to specify robust declassification as a 2-safety property on those release events. If every
pair of untrusted inputs results in the same trace of confidentiality release events, the program satisfies robust
declassification. However, to identify confidentiality release events requires comparing traces with different
secret inputs. A trace consists of a set of observable states, not a set of release events. Release events are
identified by varying secrets; the robustness of releases is identified by varying untrusted input. Thus we
need 4 traces to properly characterize robust declassification.
Both prior work [10] and our definition in Section 6.4 state robust declassification in terms of four traces,
making it easy to convert to a 4-hyperproperty. That formulation cannot, however, be directly translated to
4-safety. It instead requires a statement about trace prefixes, which cannot be invalidated by extending
traces.
Instead of simply reformulating Definition 3 with trace prefixes, we modify it using insights gained from
the definition of NMIF. In particular, instead of a strict requirement that if a relevant attack results in public-
equivalent trace prefixes then other attacks must as well, we relax this requirement to apply only when the
trace prefixes are trusted-equivalent. As noted in Section 6.6, if we syntactically prohibit endorse—the only
case in which we could enforce the previous definition—this trivially reduces to that definition. Without the
syntactic restriction, however, the new condition is still enforceable.
For a given attacker A we can define a 4-safety property with respect to A (let U , S, T , P , andW be as
in Definition 5).
RDA fi
!
T Ď T | T “  t11, t12, t21, t22(
^ tij1 ‰ ‚ ^ tij2 ‰ ‚ ^ ti11 “ ti21 ^ t1j2 “ t2j2
ùñ
´
@tniju Ď N :
`
tijnij ffW ‚ ^ ti1..ni1´1 «‹T ti2..ni2´1
^ t11..n11 «‹P t21..n21 ^ t12..n12 ff‹P t22..n22
˘
ùñ t12..n12 «W t22..n22
¯)
We then define robustness against all attackers as the intersection over all attackers: RD “ ŞARDA.
4While NMIFC produces finite traces and hyperproperties are defined for infinite traces, we can easily extend NMIFC traces
by stuttering ‚ infinitely after termination.
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NMIF
RD TE
NI
Figure 12: Relating 4-safety hyperproperties and noninterference.
The above definition structurally combines Definition 2 with the first clause of Definition 5 to capture
both the equivalence and the relevant-input statements of the original theorem. In the nested implication, if
the first two clauses hold (tijnij ffW ‚ and ti1..ni1´1 «‹T ti2..ni2´1), then one of three things must happen when
fixing the attack and varying the secret: both trace pairs are equivalent, both trace pairs are non-equivalent,
or the postcondition of the implication holds (t12..n12 «W t22..n22). The first two satisfy the equivalency impli-
cation in Definition 5 while the third is exactly a demonstration that the first input is irrelevant.
Next we note that, while this does not strictly conform to the definition of robust declassification in
Definition 3 which cannot be stated as a hypersafety property,RD is equivalent to Definition 3 for programs
that do not perform endorsement. This endorse-free condition means that the equivalence clause ti1..ni1´1 «‹T
ti2..ni2´1 will be true whenever the trace prefixes refer to the same point in execution. In particular, they can
refer to the end of execution, which gives exactly the condition specified in the theorem.
As with every other result so far, the dual construction results in a 4-safety property TE representing
transparent endorsement. Since RD captures the first clause of Definition 5, TE thus captures the second.
This allows us to represent nonmalleable information flow as a 4-safety property very simply: NMIF “
RDXTE.
Figure 12 illustrates the relation between these hyperproperty definitions. Observe that the 2-safety hy-
perpropertyNI for noninterference is contained in all three 4-safety hyperproperties. The insecure example
programs of Section 2 are found in the left crescent, satisfyingRD but notNMIF.
8 Implementing NMIF
We have implemented the rules for nonmalleable information flow in context of Flame, a Haskell library
and GHC [40] plugin. Flame provides data structures and compile-time checking of type-level acts-for
constraints that are checked using a custom type-checker plugin. These constraints are used as the basis for
encoding NMIFC as a shallowly-embedded domain-specific language (DSL). We have demonstrated that
programs enforcing nonmalleable information flow can be built using this new DSL.
8.1 Information-flow monads in Flame
The DSL works by wrapping sensitive information in an abstract data type—a monad—that includes a
principal type parameter representing the confidentiality and integrity of the information.
The Flame library tracks computation on protected information as a monadic effect and provides oper-
ations that constrain such computations to enforce information security. This effect is modeled using the
IFC type class defined in Figure 13. The type class IFC is parameterized by two additional types, n in the
Labeled type class and e in Monad. Instances of the Labeled type class enforce noninterference on pure
computation—no downgrading or effects. The e parameter represents an effect we want to control. For
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class (Monad e, Labeled n) => IFC m e n where
protect :: (pc Ď l) => a -> m e n pc l a
use :: (l Ď l’, pc Ď pc’, l Ď pc’, pc Ď pc’’) =>
m e n pc l a -> (a -> m e n pc’ l’ b)
-> m e n pc’’ l’ b
runIFC :: m e n pc l a -> e (n l a)
Figure 13: Core information flow control operations in Flame.
class IFC m e n => NMIF m e n where
declassify :: ( (C pc) Ď (C l)
, (C l’) Ď (C l) \ ∆(I (l’ \ pc))
, (I l’) === (I l)) =>
m e n pc l’ a -> m e n pc l a
endorse :: ( (I pc) Ď (I l)
, (I l’) Ď (I l) \ ∇(C (l’ \ pc))
, (C l’) === (C l)) =>
m e n pc l’ a -> m e n pc l a
Figure 14: Nonmalleable information flow control in Flame.
instance, many Flame libraries control effects in the IO monad, which is used for input, output, and mutable
references.
The type m e n pc l a in Figure 13 associates a label l with the result of a computation of type a,
as well as a program counter label pc that bounds the confidentiality and integrity of side effects for some
effect e. Confidentiality and integrity projections are represented by type constructors C and I. The protect
operator corresponds to monadic unit η (rule UNITM). Given any term, protect labels the term and lifts it
into an IFC type where pc Ď l.
The use operation corresponds to a bind term in NMIFC. Its constraints implement the BINDM
typing rule. Given a protected value of type m e n pc l a and a function on a value of type a with
return type m e n pc’ l’ b, use returns the result of applying the function, provided that l Ď l’ and
(pc \ l) Ď pc’. Finally, runIFC executes a protected computation, which results in a labeled value of
type (n l a) in the desired effect e.
We provide NMIF, which extends the IFC type class with endorse and declassify operations. The
constraints on these operations implement the typing rules ENDORSE and DECL respectively.
We implemented the secure and insecure sealed-bid auction examples from Section 2.2 using NMIF
operations, shown in Figure 15. As expected, the insecure badrecv is rejected by the compiler while the
secure recv type checks.
8.2 Nonmalleable HTTP Basic Authentication
To show the utility of NMIFC, we adapt a simple existing Haskell web application [20] based on the
Servant [36] framework to run in Flame. The application allows users to create, fetch, and delete shared
memos. Our version uses HTTP Basic Authentication and Flame’s security mechanisms to restrict access to
authorized users. We have deployed this application online at http://memo.flow.limited.
Figure 16 contains the function authCheck, which checks passwords in this application using the NM
data type, which is an instance of the NMIF type class. The function takes a value containing the username
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recv :: (NMIF m e n, (I p) Ď ∇(C p)) =>
n p a
-> m e n (I (p ^ q)) (p ^ (I q)) a
recv v = endorse $ lift v
badrecv :: (NMIF m e n, (I p) Ď ∇(C p)) =>
n (p ^ C q) a
-> m e n (I (p ^ q)) (p ^ q) a
badrecv v = endorse $ lift v {-REJECTED-}
Figure 15: Receive operations in NMIF. The secure recv is accepted, but the insecure badrecv is rejected.
authCheck :: Lbl MemoClient BasicAuthData
-> NM IO (I MemoServer) (I MemoServer)
(BasicAuthResult Prin)
authCheck lauth =
let lauth’ = endorse $ lift lauth
res = use lauth’ $ \(BasicAuthData user guess) ->
ebind user_db $ \db ->
case Map.lookup user db of
Nothing -> protect Unauthorized
Just pwd ->
if guess == pwd then
protect $ Authorized (Name user)
else
protect Unauthorized
in declassify res
Figure 16: A nonmalleable password checker in Servant.
and password guess of the authentication attempt, labeled with the confidentiality and integrity of an unau-
thenticated client, MemoClient. This value is endorsed to have the integrity of the server, MemoServer.
This operation is safe since it only endorses information visible to the client. Next, the username is used to
look up the correct password and compare it to the client’s guess. If they match, then the user is authorized.
The result of this comparison is secret, so before returning the result, it must be declassified.
Enforcing any form of information flow control on authentication mechanisms like authCheck provides
more information security guarantees than traditional approaches. Unlike other approaches, nonmalleable
information flow offers strong guarantees even when a computation endorses untrusted information. This
example shows it is possible to construct applications that offer these guarantees.
9 Related work
Our efforts belong both within a significant body of work attempting to develop semantic security conditions
that are more nuanced than noninterference, and within an overlapping body of work aiming to create
expressive practical enforcement mechanisms for information flow control. Most prior work focuses on
relaxing confidentiality restrictions; work permitting downgrading of integrity imposes relatively simple
controls and lacks semantic security conditions that capture the concerns exemplified in Section 2.
Intransitive noninterference [28, 31, 33, 41] is an information flow condition that permits information
to flow only between security levels (or domains) according to some (possibly intransitive) relation. It does
not address the concerns of nonmalleability.
Decentralized information flow control (DIFC) [25] introduces the idea of mediating downgrading using
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access control [29]. However, the lack of robustness and transparency means downgrading can still be
exploited in these systems (e.g., [15, 21, 24, 47]).
Robust declassification and qualified robustness have been explored in DIFC systems as a way to con-
strain the adversary’s influence on declassification [4–6, 11, 26, 45, 46]. While transparent endorsement can
be viewed as an integrity counterpart to robust declassification, this idea is not present in prior work.
Sabelfeld and Sands provide a clarifying taxonomy for much prior work on declassification [35], in-
troducing various dimensions along which declassification mechanisms operate. They categorize robust
declassification as lying on the “who” dimension. However, they do not explicitly consider endorsement
mechanisms. Regardless of the taxonomic category, transparent endorsement and nonmalleable informa-
tion flow also seem to lie on the same dimension as robust declassification, since they take into account
influences on the information that is downgraded.
Label algebras [23] provide an abstract characterization of several DIFC systems. However, they do not
address the restrictions on downgrading imposed by nonmalleable information flow.
The Aura language [19] uses information flow policies to constrain authorization and endorsement.
However, it does not address the malleability of endorsement. Rx [39] represents information flow control
policies in terms of dynamic roles [17]. Adding new principals to these roles corresponds to declassification
and endorsement since new flows may occur. Rx constrains updates to roles similarly to previous type sys-
tems that enforce robust declassification and qualified robustness but does not prevent opaque endorsements.
Relational Hoare Type Theory [27] (RHTT) offers a powerful and precise way to specify security condi-
tions that are 2-hyperproperties, such as noninterference. Cartesian Hoare logic [37] (CHL) extends standard
Hoare logic to reason about k-safety properties of relational traces (the input/output pairs of a program).
Since nonmalleable information flow, robust declassification, and transparent endorsement are all 4-safety
properties that cannot be fully expressed with relational traces, neither RHTT nor CHL can characterize
them properly.
Haskell’s type system has been attractive target for embedding information flow checking [9, 22, 38].
Much prior work has focused on dynamic information flow control. LIO [38] requires computation on pro-
tected information to occur in the LIO monad, which tracks the confidentiality and integrity of information
accessed (“unlabeled”) by the computation. HLIO [9] explores hybrid static and dynamic enforcement.
Flame enforces information flow control statically, and the NMIF type class enforces nonmalleable IFC stat-
ically as well. The static component of HLIO enforces solely via the Haskell type system (and existing
general-purpose extensions), but Flame—and by extension, NMIF—uses custom constraints based on the
FLAM algebra which are processed by a GHC type checker plugin. Extending the type checker to reason
about FLAM constraints significantly improves programmability over pure-Haskell approaches like HLIO.
10 Conclusion
Downgrading mechanisms like declassification and endorsement make information flow mechanisms suf-
ficiently flexible and expressive for real programs. However, we have shown that previous notions of
information-flow security missed the dangers endorsing confidential information. We therefore introduced
transparent endorsement as a security property that rules out such influences and showed that it is dual to
robust declassification. Robust declassification and transparent endorsement are both consequences of a
stronger property, nonmalleable information flow, and we have formulated all three as 4-safety properties.
We have shown how to provably enforce these security properties in an efficient, compositional way using
a security type system. Based on our Haskell implementation, these security conditions and enforcement
mechanism appear to be practical, supporting the secure construction of programs with complex security
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requirements.
While security-typed languages are not yet mainstream, information flow control, sometimes in the
guise of taint tracking, has become popular as a way to detect and control real-world vulnerabilities (e.g.,
[16]). Just as the program analyses used are approximations of previous security type systems targeting
noninterference, it is reasonable to expect the NMIFC type system to be a useful guide for other analyses
and enforcement mechanisms.
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n P N (atomic principals)
x P V (variable names)
p, `, pc ::“ n ˇˇ J ˇˇ K ˇˇ ppi ˇˇ p^ p ˇˇ p_ p ˇˇ p\ p ˇˇ p[ p
τ ::“ unit ˇˇ X ˇˇ pτ ` τq ˇˇ pτ ˆ τqˇˇ
τ
pcÝÑ τ ˇˇ @Xrpcs. τ ˇˇ ` says τ
v ::“ pq ˇˇ inji v ˇˇ xv, vy ˇˇ pη` vqˇˇ
λpx :τqrpcs. e ˇˇ ΛXrpcs. e
e ::“ x ˇˇ v ˇˇ e e ˇˇ e τ ˇˇ xe, ey ˇˇ pη` eqˇˇ
proji e
ˇˇ
inji e
ˇˇ
bind x “ e in eˇˇ
case e of inj1pxq.e | inj2pxq.eˇˇ
decl e to `
ˇˇ
endorse e to `
Figure 17: Full NMIFC syntax.
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A Full NMIFC
We present the full syntax, semantics, and typing rules for NMIFC in Figures 17, 18, and 20, respectively.
This is a straightforward extension of the core language presented in Section 5. We note that polymorphic
terms specify a pc just as λ terms. This is because they contain arbitrary expressions which could produce
arbitrary effects, so we must constrain the context that can execute those effects.
Figure 21 presents the full set of derivation rules for the acts-for (delegation) relation p ě q.
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e ÝÑ e1
rE-APPs pλpx :τqrpcs. eq v ÝÑ erx ÞÑ vs rE-TAPPs pΛXrpcs. eq τ ÝÑ erX ÞÑ τ s
rE-UNPAIRs proji xv1, v2y ÝÑ vi rE-CASEs pcase pinji vq of inj1pxq.e1 | inj2pxq.e2q ÝÑ eirx ÞÑ vs
rE-BINDMs bind x “ pη` vq in e ÝÑ erx ÞÑ vs
xe, ty ÝÑ @e1, t1D
rE-STEPs e ÝÑ e
1
xe, ty ÝÑ @e1, t; ‚D rE-UNITMs xpη` vq, ty ÝÑ xpη` vq, t; pη` vqy
rE-DECLs xdecl pη`1 vq to `, ty ÝÑ xpη` vq, t; pÓÑ`1 , η` vqy
rE-ENDORSEs xendorse pη`1 vq to `, ty ÝÑ xpη` vq, t; pÓÐ`1 , η` vqy rE-EVALs
xe, ty ÝÑ @e1, t1D
xEres, ty ÝÑ @Ere1s, t1D
Evaluation context
E ::“ r¨s ˇˇ E e ˇˇ v E ˇˇ E τ ˇˇ xE, ey ˇˇ xv,Ey ˇˇ pη` Eqˇˇ
proji E
ˇˇ
inji E
ˇˇ
bind x “ E in eˇˇ
case E of inj1pxq.e | inj2pxq.eˇˇ
decl E to `
ˇˇ
endorse E to `
Figure 18: Full NMIFC operational semantics.
A.1 Label tracking with brackets
In order to simply proofs of hyperproperties requiring 2 and 4 traces, we introduce a new bracket syntax to
track secret and untrusted data. These brackets are inspired by those used by Pottier and Simonet [30] to
prove their FlowCaml type system enforced noninterference. Their brackets served two purposes simulta-
neously. First they allow a single execution of a bracketed program to faithfully model two executions of
a non-bracketed program. Second, the brackets track secret/untrusted information through execution of the
program, thereby making it easy to verify that it did not interfere with public/trusted information simply by
proving that brackets could not be syntactically present in such values. Since noninterference only requires
examining pairs of traces, these purposes complement each other well; if the two executions vary only on
high inputs, then low outputs cannot contain brackets.
While this technique is very effective to prove noninterference, nonmalleable information flow provides
security guarantees even in the presence of both declassification and endorsement. As a result, we need
to track secret/untrusted information even through downgrading events that can cause traces to differ arbi-
trarily. To accomplish this goal, we use brackets that serve only the second purpose: they track restricted
information but not multiple executions.
As in previous formalizations, NMIFC’s brackets are defined with respect to a notion of “high” labels,
in this case a high set. The high set restricts the type of the expression inside the bracket as well as the
pc at which it must type, thereby restricting the effects it can create. For the more complex theorems we
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$ ` Ď τ
rP-UNITs $ ` Ď unit rP-LBLs `
1 Ď `
$ `1 Ď ` says τ rP-PAIRs
$ ` Ď τ1 $ ` Ď τ2
$ ` Ď pτ1 ˆ τ2q
$ τ Ď H
rP-SETs H P H $ H Ď τ$ τ protH H is upward closed
Figure 19: Type protection levels.
must track data with multiple different high labels within the same program execution, so we parameterize
the brackets themselves with the high set. We present the extended syntax, semantics, and typing rules in
Figure 22.
B Attacker properties
Recall that we defined an attacker as a set of principals A “ t` P L | n1 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ nk ě `u for some
non-empty finite set of atomic principals tn1, . . . , nku Ď N .
Definition 6 (Attacker properties). Let A be an attacker and let Api “ tp P L | Dq P L such that ppi ^ qpi1 P
Au. The following properties hold:
1. for all a1, a2 P Api, a1 ^ a2 P Api (Attacking principals may collude)
2. for all a P Api and b P L, a_ b P Api (Attackers may attenuate their power)
3. for all b1, b2 R Api, b1 _ b2 R Api (Combining public information in a public context yields public
information and combining trusted information in a trusted context yields trusted information)
4. for all a P L and b R Api, a ^ b R Api (Attackers cannot compromise policies requiring permission
from non-attacking principals)
5. for all a P A,∇paÑq ^∆paÐq P A. (Attackers have the same power in confidentiality and integrity)
The theorems proved in this paper hold for any attacker satisfying these properties, so for generality we
can take the properties in Definition 6 as defining an attacker.
We now prove that our original definition of an attacker satisfies Definition 6.
Proof. Conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 6 follow directly from the definition of A and CONJR and DISR,
respectively. Condition 5 holds by the symmetry of the lattice.
Since we are only examining one of confidentiality and integrity at a time, for the following conditions
we assume without loss of generality that all principals in each expression have only the pi projection and
the other component is K. In particular, this means we can assume PROJ and PROJR are not used in any
derivation, and any application of the conjunction or disjunction derivation rules split in a meaningful way
with respect to the pi projection (i.e., neither principal in the side being divided is J or K).
We now show Condition 4 holds by contradiction. Assume a P L and b R Api, but a ^ b P Api.
This means pn1 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ nkqpi ě a^ b. We prove by induction on k that a, b P Api. If k “ 1, then the
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Γ; pc $ e : τ
rVARs Γ, x :τ,Γ1; pc $ x : τ rUNITs Γ; pc $ pq : unit rLAMs Γ, x :τ1; pc
1 $ e : τ2
Γ; pc $ λpx :τ1qrpc1s. e : τ1 pc
1ÝÑ τ2
rAPPs
Γ; pc $ e1 : τ 1 pc
1ÝÑ τ
Γ; pc $ e2 : τ 1 pc Ď pc1
Γ; pc $ e1 e2 : τ rTLAMs
Γ, X; pc1 $ e : τ
Γ; pc $ ΛXrpc1s. e : @Xrpc1s. τ
rTAPPs
Γ; pc $ e : @Xrpc1s. τ
pc Ď pc1
Γ; pc $ pe τ 1q : τ rX ÞÑ τ 1s τ
1 is well-formed in Γ rPAIRs Γ; pc $ e1 : τ1 Γ; pc $ e2 : τ2
Γ; pc $ xe1, e2y : pτ1 ˆ τ2q
rUNPAIRs Γ; pc $ e : pτ1 ˆ τ2q
Γ; pc $ proji e : τi
rINJs Γ; pc $ e : τi
Γ; pc $ inji e : pτ1 ` τ2q
rCASEs
Γ; pc $ e : pτ1 ` τ2q $ pc Ď τ
Γ, x :τ1; pc $ e1 : τ Γ, x :τ2; pc $ e2 : τ
Γ; pc $ case e of inj1pxq.e1 | inj2pxq.e2 : τ
rUNITMs Γ; pc $ e : τ pc Ď `
Γ; pc $ pη` eq : ` says τ
rVUNITMs Γ; pc $ v : τ
Γ; pc $ pη` vq : ` says τ
rBINDMs
Γ; pc $ e : ` says τ 1 $ ` Ď τ
Γ, x :τ 1; pc\ ` $ e1 : τ
Γ; pc $ bind x “ e in e1 : τ
rDECLs
Γ; pc $ e : `1 says τ `1Ð “ `Ð pc Ď `
`1Ñ Ď `Ñ \∆pp`1 \ pcqÐq
Γ; pc $ decl e to ` : ` says τ
rENDORSEs
Γ; pc $ e : `1 says τ `1Ñ “ `Ñ pc Ď `
`1Ð Ď `Ð \∇pp`1 \ pcqÑq
Γ; pc $ endorse e to ` : ` says τ
Figure 20: Typing rules for full NMIFC language.
only possible rule to derive this result is CONJL and we are finished. If k ą 1, then the derivation of this
relation must be due to either CONJL or CONJR. If it is due to CONJR, then this again achieves the desired
contradiction. If it is due to CONJL, then the same statement holds for a subset of the atomic principals
n11, . . . , n1k1 , where k1 ă k, so by induction, pn11 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ n1k1qpi ě bpi, and by TRANS, pn1 ^ . . .^ nkqpi ě bpi
which also contradicts our assumption.
Finally, we also show Condition 3 holds by contradiction. We assume b1, b2 R Api but b1 _ b2 P Api and
again prove a contradiction by induction on k. If k “ 1, then the derivation showing npi1 ě pb1 _ b2qpi must
end with DISR which contradicts the assumption that b1, b2 R Api. If k ą 1, the derivation either ends with
DISR, resulting in the same contradiction, or with CONJL. In this second case, the same argument as above
holds: there is a strict subset of the principals n1, . . . , nk that act for either b1 or b2 and thus by TRANS we
acquire the desired contradiction.
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p ě q
rBOTs p ě K rTOPs J ě p rREFLs p ě p rPROJs p ě q
ppi ě qpi
rPROJRs p ě ppi
rCONJLs
pi ě q
i P t1, 2u
p1 ^ p2 ě q rCONJRs
p ě q1
p ě q2
p ě q1 ^ q2 rDISLs
p1 ě q
p2 ě q
p1 _ p2 ě q rDISRs
p ě qi
i P t1, 2u
p ě q1 _ q2
rTRANSs p ě q q ě r
p ě r
Figure 21: Principal lattice rules
C Generalization
Definition 5 (and correspondingly Theorem 6) might appear relatively narrow; they only speak directly to
programs with a single untrusted value and a single secret value. However, because the language has first-
class functions and pair types, the theorem as stated is equivalent to one that allows insertion of secret and
untrusted code into multiple points in the program, as long as that code types in an appropriately restrictive
pc.
To define this formally, we first need a means to allow for insertion of arbitrary code. We follow previous
work [26] by extending the language to include holes. A program expression may contain an ordered set of
holes. These holes may be replaced with arbitrary expressions, under restrictions requiring that the holes be
treated as sufficiently secret or untrusted. Specifically, the type system is extended with the following rule:
rHOLEs pc P H $ τ protH
Γ; pc $ r‚sH : τ H is a high set
Using this definition, we can state NMIF in a more traditional form.
Definition 7 (General NMIF). We say that a program er~‚sH enforces general NMIF if the following holds
for all attackers A inducing high sets U and S. Let T “ LzU , P “ LzS andW “ T X S . If H Ď U , then
for all values v1, v2 and all attacks ~a1 and ~a2, let
xer~aisHr~x ÞÑ ~vis, ~viy ÝÑ˚
@
vij , t
ij
D
.
For all indices nij such that t
ij
nij ffW ‚
1. If ti1..ni1´1 «‹T ti2..ni2´1 for i “ 1, 2, then`
relÐA,epw1q and t11..n11 «‹P t21..n21
˘ ùñ t12..n12 «‹P t22..n22 .
2. Similarly, if t1j..n1j´1 «‹P t2j..n2j´1 for j “ 1, 2, then`
relÑA,epv1q and t11..n11 «‹T t12..n12
˘ ùñ t21..n21 «‹T t22..n22 .
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Syntax extensions
v ::“ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˇˇ L v MH
e ::“ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˇˇ L e MH
New contexts
E ::“ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˇˇ LE MH
B ::“ proji r¨s
ˇˇ
bind x “ r¨s in e
Evaluation extensions
rB-EXPANDs BrL v MHs ÝÑ LBrvs MH rB-DECLLs ` R H
decl L v MH to ` ÝÑ decl v to `
rB-DECLHs ` P H
decl L v MH to ` ÝÑ L decl v to ` MH
rB-ENDORSELs ` R H
endorse L v MH to ` ÝÑ endorse v to `
rB-ENDORSEHs ` P H
endorse L v MH to ` ÝÑ L endorse v to ` MH
Typing extensions
rBRACKETs
Γ; pc1 $ e : τ pc Ď pc1
pc1 P H $ τ protH
Γ; pc $ L e MH : τ H is upward closed
Bracket projection
teu “
#
te1u if e “ L e1 MH
recursively project all sub-expressions otherwise
Figure 22: NMIFC language extensions.
For NMIFC, this definition is equivalent to Definition 5. We prove this fact to prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 7 (General NMIF). Given a program er~‚sH such that Γ, ~x :~τ ; pc $ er~‚sH : τ 1, then er~‚sH enforces
general NMIF.
Proof. We prove this by reducing Definition 7 to Definition 5 in two steps. We assume that no two variables
in the original expression er~‚sH have the same name as this can be enforced by α-renaming.
The first step handles expressions that only substitute values (and have no holes), but allow any number
of both secret and untrusted values. An expression of the form in this corollary is easily rewritten as such
a substitution as follows. For each hole r‚sH, we note that Γ1; pc1 $ r‚sH : τ2 where Γ, ~x : ~τ Ď Γ1 and
pc1 P H. We replace the hole with a function application inside a bind. Specifically, the hole becomes
bind y1 “ y in `y1 z1 ¨ ¨ ¨ zk˘
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where y and y1 are fresh variables and the zis are every variable in Γ1zΓ (including every element of ~x). Let
τy “ pc1 says
ˆ
τz1
pc1ÝÑ ¨ ¨ ¨ pc1ÝÑ τzk pc
1ÝÑ τ2
˙
and include y :τy as the type of an untrusted value to substitute in.
Instead of inserting the expression a into that hole, we substitute in for y the value
w “ ηpc1
`
λpz1 :τz1qrpc1s. ¨ ¨ ¨ λpzk :τzkqrpc1s. a
˘
.
By HOLE we know that pc1 P H and$ τ2 protH, so the type has the proper protection, and by construction
Γ; pc $ w : τy. Moreover, while it has an extra value at the beginning of the trace (the function), the rest of
the traces are necessarily the same.
As a second step, we reduce the rest of the way to the expressions used in Definition 5. To get from our
intermediate step to these single-value expressions, if we wish to substitute ks secret values and ku untrusted
values, we instead substitute a single list of ks secret values and a single list of ku untrusted values. These
lists are constructed in the usual way out of pairs, meaning the protection relations continue to hold as
required. Finally, whenever a variable is referenced in the unsubstituted expression, we instead select the
appropriate element out of the substituted list using nested projections.
We also note that the same result holds if we allow for insertion of secret code and untrusted values, as
the argument is exactly dual. Such a situation, however, makes less sense, so we do not present it explicitly.
D Proofs
We now prove a variety of properties about NMIFC.
D.1 Language results
We begin with the core results about the language itself.
Lemma 1 (Values). For any value v such that Γ; pc $ v : τ , Γ; pc1 $ v : τ for any pc1.
Proof. This follows by induction on the typing derivation for values.
Lemma 2 (Substitution). If Γ, x :τ 1; pc $ e : τ and Γ; pc $ v : τ 1, then Γ; pc $ erx ÞÑ vs : τ .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ, x :τ 1; pc $ e : τ using Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 (pc reduction). If Γ; pc $ e : τ and pc1 Ď pc, then Γ; pc1 $ e : τ .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ; pc $ e : τ .
Theorem 8 (Subject reduction). If Γ; pc $ e : τ and xe, ty ÝÑ xe1, t1y then Γ; pc $ e1 : τ .
Proof. This proof follows by an inductive case analysis on the operational semantics in Figures 18 and 22.
There are a few interesting cases.
Case B-EXPAND: This case handles a context (B), we will do a sub-case analysis on each such expression
type.
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• e “ pproji L v MHq: UNPAIR allows the expression to type-check in any pc in which its argument type-
checks. Since BRACKET says Γ; pc1 $ v : pτ1 ˆ τ2q for some pc1 P H, we get that Γ; pc1 $ proji v : τi.
Moreover BRACKET and P-SET also require $ H Ď pτ1 ˆ τ2q which, by P-PAIR can only happen if
$ H Ď τi for i “ 1, 2. Together these satisfy the requirements for BRACKET and give us Γ; pc1 $L proji v MH : τi.
• e “ pbind x “ L v MH in e1q: By BINDM, Γ; pc $ L v MH : ` says τ 1 and by BRACKET and inversion
on the protection rules, H Ď ` for some H P H and thus ` P H. Let pc1 “ pc2 [ ppc \ `q where
pc2 is the higher pc used in BRACKET. Since H is upward closed and pc2, ` P H, ppc \ `q P H and
thus pc1 P H. Moreover, pc1 \ ` ” pc\ `, so by BINDM Γ, x :τ 1; pc1 \ ` $ e1 : τ and by Lemma 1
Γ; pc1 $ v : ` says τ 1. This means that Γ; pc1 $ bind x “ v in e1 : τ . Also by BINDM we have$ ` Ď τ
so since ` P H we have now satisfied the conditions on BRACKET and Γ; pc $ L bind x “ v in e1 MH : τ .
Case B-DECLH: By DECL Γ; pc $ L v MH : `1 says τ 1 and by inspection on the protection rules and
BRACKET, it must be the case that H Ď `1 for some H P H and thus `1 P H.
By assumption ` P H, so the final protection requirement of BRACKET on the stepped expression is
satisfied. We now claim that if pc1 “ pc \ ` then Γ; pc1 $ decl v to ` : τ . DECL gives us that pc Ď `, so
clearly pc1 “ pc\ ` Ď `.
DECL also gives us `1Ñ Ď `Ñ \∆pp`1 \ pcqÐq. Since `1Ð “ `Ð, we note that
p`1 \ pcqÐ “ p`\ pcqÐ “ pc1Ð.
Therefore p`1 \ pc1qÐ “ p`1 \ pcqÐ and the premise still holds.
Since the other premises DECL are trivially still satisfied in a higher pc (using Lemma 1 for v to type),
we see that Γ; pc1 $ decl v to ` : τ . Thus since pc1 P H and ` P H, we get Γ; pc $ L decl v to ` MH : τ .
Case B-ENDORSEH: We omit the details of this case as they are identical to the previous case, but with
projection arrows reversed and ∆ replaced by∇.
All other cases follow trivially from inspection on the typing derivations in Figure 8 and applications of
Lemmas 2 and 3. Rule E-EVAL also requires an inductive application.
Lemma 4 (Bracket Soundness). If xe, y ÝÑ˚ xe1, ty then xteu, y ÝÑ˚ xte1u, ttuy.
Proof. This result follows by inspection on the operational semantics in Figures 18 and 22. Note that
every step the non-projected expression takes is mirrored exactly by a step the projected value takes except
applications of B-EXPAND, B-DECLL, B-DECLH, B-ENDORSEL, and B-ENDORSEH. Those applications
are simply dropped and since they emit no values to the trace, the traces remain the same.
Lemma 5 (Bracket Completeness). If xteu, y ÝÑ˚ xe1, ty and Γ; pc $ e : τ , then there is some e2, t1 such
that xe, y ÝÑ˚ xe2, t1y.
Proof. Assume xteu, y ÝÑ˚ xe1, ty and consider the operational semantics in Figures 18 and 22. We
consider a single step in the projected expression which gives us two cases.
If the step happens either entirely within a bracket or entirely outside brackets, then the same step
must be possible in the original expression. If the step in the original expression is not possible because
of brackets, then there must be brackets around a term other than an arbitrary expression or value in the
semantic rule employed. Since the expression type-checks and by Theorem 8, each intermediate expression
also type-checks, the protection clause on BRACKET and inversion on the protection rules in Figure 7 give us
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four possible options for the semantic rule employed: E-UNPAIR, E-BINDM, E-DECL, and E-ENDORSE.
For the first two, we can first step using B-EXPAND one or more times before applying the original rule. For
the second two, we can apply B-DECLL, B-DECLH, B-ENDORSEL, or B-ENDORSEH one or more times
again before applying the original rule.
In all cases we see that if the projected term steps and equivalent step is possible in the original expres-
sion, though possibly after applying one or more other steps first. This proves the desired result.
D.2 Security results
We now prove the various security results stated throughout the paper.
Lemma 6 (Release on downgrade). Let H be a high set and W “ LzH. Given a program e such that
Γ, x :τ1; pc $ e : τ2 with $ τ1 protH, for all v1, v2 with Γ; pc $ vi : τ1, let
xerx ÞÑ L vi MHs, viy ÝÑ˚ @v1i, tiD .
If n1 and n2 are such that tini ffW ‚ and t1..n1´1 «‹W t2..n2´1, then either tini “ pÓpi`1 , η` wiq with `1 P H and
` R H for both i “ 1, 2, or t1n1 «W t2n2 .
Proof. We refer to elements of the form pÓpi`1 , η` wq with `1 P H and ` R H as relevant downgrade elements.
This is a proof by induction on the number of relevant downgrade elements in t1..n1´1 and t
2
..n2´1. Note that
while the prefixes can contain any number of relevant downgrade elements, the prefixes areW-equivalent,
so the downgraded values must also beW-equivalent. In particular, there must be the same number in each
trace prefix.
As the base case, assume there are no such values in the trace prefixes. We first claim that there can be
no application of B-DECLL or B-ENDORSEL prior to the current step.
By the typing rules DECL and ENDORSE, that would require the value inside the bracket to have type
`1 says τ for some type τ . The protection clause on BRACKET and the protection rules in Figure 19 would
thus require there to be some H P H such that H Ď `1, which in turn means `1 P H. However, application
of B-DECLL or B-ENDORSEL requires ` R H. Therefore if either rule is applied, the next value emitted to
the trace must be pÓpi`1 , η` wq where `1 P H and ` R H. While tini may be of that form, we assumed that no
prior values are.
Next we claim that any differences between the two prefixes must be emitted from within brackets.
The initial expression in each case differs only in the substituted value, which is inside brackets. If we
syntactically examine the expression at every step of evaluation, we notice that no semantic rules allow
anything inside brackets to affect anything outside brackets except through the B-DECLL and B-ENDORSEL
rules, which remove brackets. Since those rules are never applied, all differences must be contained within
brackets. This means that all differences within the prefixes must have been emitted from inside brackets.
Finally, we claim that if a trace element c is emitted from within a bracket, then c «W ‚. The only three
rules that emit trace elements are E-UNITM, E-DECL, and E-ENDORSE. By Theorem 8, the expression
stepping must type check, and each of the corresponding typing rules (UNITM, DECL, and ENDORSE)
contain the condition pc Ď `. By BRACKET, if the expression is inside a bracket then pc P H and since H
is upward closed, this means ` P H. Thus by EQ-UNITM or EQ-DOWN, c «W ‚.
Coupled with the above logic about applications of B-DECLL and B-ENDORSEL and the fact that
tini ffW ‚, either t1n1 «W t2n2 , or both are the result of downgrades that resulted in applications of either
B-DECLL or B-ENDORSEL. In the latter case both are of the form pÓpi`1 , η` wq where `1 P H and ` R H, as
desired.
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Now we assume that there is at least one such expression in the trace prefixes, but those prefixes are
stillW-equivalent. Take the first such trace element. This element must appear in both trace prefixes. Let
e1 and e2 be the top-level expressions that stepped in each trace to emit the downgrade element. The two
expressions can differ inside brackets, and can differ inside the downgraded value (that was previously inside
brackets). Because the downgraded values areW-equivalent, any such differences must be contained inside
terms of the form pη` wq where ` P H. We can replace any such terms by L η` w MH in the expression and
it will still type-check since ` P H and w type-checks in any pc. This results in a new pair of expressions
that areW-equivalent except inside brackets. By Lemmas 4 and 5 these expression generate traces that are
equivalent to the original up to brackets and bullets. By construction, these new expressions generate trace
prefixes with one less pÓpi`1 , η` wq element than the original expressions, so by the inductive hypothesis, the
result holds.
Since the same brackets were necessarily added in both expressions, the new expressions will thus
generate equivalent traces if and only if the old expressions did. Since the trace prefixes prior to this modifi-
cation were equivalent, if the new expressions generate equivalent traces, the original expressions must also
generate equivalent traces. Thus the result holds for the original traces as well.
Theorem 1 (Noninterference of non-downgrading programs). LetH be a high set and letW “ LzH. Given
an expression e such that Γ, x :τ1; pc $ e : τ2 where $ τ1 protH, for all v1, v2 with Γ; pc $ vi : τ1, if
xerx ÞÑ vis, viy ÝÑ˚
@
v1i, ti
D
then either there is some pÓpi`1 , η` wq P ti where `1 P H and ` R H, or t1 «‹W t2.
Proof. Since Γ; pc $ vi : τ1 and $ τ1 protH, BRACKET says Γ; pc $ L vi MH : τ1. Lemmas 4 and 5 tell
us that the result holds as stated above if and only if it holds when substituting L vi MH instead of vi. From
there we can apply Lemma 6. If there are no pÓpi`1 , η` wq events in either trace with `1 P H and ` R H, then
eachW-visible term in each trace must be equivalent to each other by induction on the number of elements
(empty traces are equivalent).
Theorem 2 (Noninterference of high-pc programs). Let A be an attacker inducing high sets U and S. Let
H be one of those high sets and W “ LzH. Given an expression e such that Γ, x :τ1; pc $ e : τ2 where
$ τ1 protH, for all v1, v2 with Γ; pc $ vi : τ1, if xerx ÞÑ vis, viy ÝÑ˚ xv1i, tiy and pc P U Y S, then
t1 «‹W t2.
Proof. We claim that neither trace contains any pÓpi`1 , η` wq elements where `1 P H and ` R H, thus reducing
this to Theorem 1. There are three cases to consider here: pc P H, pc P U and H “ S, and pc P S and
H “ U .
Case pc P H: Both DECL and ENDORSE require pc Ď `, so by upward-closure ofH, ` P H.
Case pc P U and H “ S: DECL contains the condition `1Ñ Ď `Ñ \∆pp`1 \ pcqÐq. Converting into the
authority lattice, this gives us `Ñ ^∆pp`1 _ pcqÐq ě `1Ñ. Since U “ AÐ, Condition 2 of Definition 6
means p`1 _ pcqÐ P AÐ and thus Condition 5 means that ∆pp`1 _ pcqÐq P AÑ, so by Condition 1 of
Definition 6, if `Ñ P AÑ, then by transitivity `1Ñ P AÑ. Since H “ S “ LzpAÑq, this means ` R H only
if `1 R H.
Case pc P S and H “ U : This argument is nearly identical to the previous case. ENDORSE means `1Ð Ď
`Ð \∇pp`1 \ pcqÑq which, in the authority lattice, means `1Ð ě `Ð _∇pp`1 ^ pcqÑq. Since pc P S “
LzpAÑq, Condition 4 of Definition 6 ensures p`1 ^ pcqÑ P S. Thus Condition 5 means ∇pp`1 ^ pcqÑq R
AÐ “ H, so Condition 3 and transitivity mean that `Ð R H only if `1Ð R H.
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Theorem 3 (Noninterference of secret–untrusted data). Let A be an attacker inducing high sets U and S.
Let H “ U X S andW “ LzH. Given an expression e such that Γ, x :τ1; pc $ e : τ2 where $ τ1 protH,
for all v1, v2 with Γ; pc $ vi : τ1, if xerx ÞÑ vis, viy ÝÑ˚ xv1i, tiy then t1 «‹W t2.
Proof. First we note thatH is a high set as the intersection of two upward closed sets is also upward closed.
We claim that neither trace contains any pÓpi`1 , η` wq elements where `1 P H and ` R H, thus reducing this to
Theorem 1. We will cover the two cases of pi separately despite their similarities.
Case pi “ Ñ: The only way to emit pÓÑ`1 , η` wq is through E-DECL. By Theorem 8, each intermediate
expression type-checks under the same initial context. This is a sub-expression, meaning there is some Γ1,
pc1, and τ such that
Γ1; pc1 $ decl pη`1 vq to ` : ` says τ .
Therefore DECL tells us that `1Ñ Ď `Ñ \∆pp`1 \ pc1qÐq. Every typing rule either moves pc up the lattice
(by joining it with another label) or leaves it unchanged, so pc Ď pc1 and therefore ∆ppc1Ðq Ď ∆ppcÐq,
meaning `1Ñ Ď `Ñ \∆pp`1 \ pcqÐq. Converting to the authority lattice gives us `Ñ ^∆pp`1 _ pcqÐq ě
`1Ñ.
If `1 P H, then `1Ð P U “ AÐ, so by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2, Definition 6
gives us that ∆pp`1 _ pcqÐq P AÑ. Thus by Condition 1 of Definition 6 and transitivity, if `Ñ P AÑ it
must also be the case that `1Ñ P AÑ. However, `1 P H, so `1Ñ P S “ LzpAÑq. Therefore `Ñ P S . Since
`1 P H and `1Ð “ `Ð, this means ` P H.
Case pi “ Ð: Dual to the above case, pÓÐ`1 , η` wq must be emitted from E-ENDORSE, so Theorem 8 now
implies that there is some Γ1, pc1, and τ such that
Γ1; pc1 $ endorse pη`1 vq to ` : τ.
Since pc Ď pc1 by the same logic as above, ENDORSE tells us `1Ð Ď `Ð \∇pp`1 \ pcqÑq. If `1 P H, then
`Ð \∇pp`1 \ pcqÑq P H. Since `1Ñ P HÑ “ LzpAÑq, we know that ∇pp`1 \ pcqÑq R AÐ by the same
argument as in the proof of Theorem 2. Since `Ð\∇pp`1 \ pcqÑq “ `Ð_∇pp`1 ^ pcqÑq, Condition 3 of
Definition 6 requires that `Ð P AÐ “ U . Since `Ñ “ `1Ñ P S, we see that ` P H.
Thus we see that for any trace element pÓpi`1 , η` wq, if `1 P H, then ` P H, so by Theorem 1 the result
holds.
Theorem 6 (Nonmalleable information flow). For any program e such that Γ, x :τx, y :τy; pc $ e : τ , e
enforces NMIF.
Proof. We provide here only a proof of case 1 of Definition 5. All statements in case 2 are exactly dual so a
precisely dual argument holds.
LetA be an attacker inducing high sets U and S and let T “ LzU , P “ LzS, andW “ T XP . To prove
case 1 we prove a contrapositive of the stated implication. Specifically, if t12..n12 ff‹P t22..n22 but relÐA,epw1q,
then t11..n11 ff‹P t21..n21 .
First we note that the theorem is uninteresting unless $ τx prot S and $ τy prot U . Since vi and wj
are both present in trace tij , if v1 ffP v2 or w1 ffT w2, the theorem is trivially true. In the former case,
varying the first input clearly results in non-equivalent traces for both attacks. In the latter case, the result
holds for nij “ 1 and the precondition is clearly false otherwise. Now consider the case where v1 «P v2
and w1 «T w2. If $ τx prot S and $ τy prot U , then these are trivially true—the interesting case we will
handle below. Otherwise the equivalences require the contents of the value to be identical (except for nested
secret/untrusted values). Any identical values clearly cannot result in distinguishable traces. We can handle
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nested secret/untrusted values by fixing the public/trusted parts of the inputs and viewing those values as the
inputs instead, thus reducing to the case where $ τx prot S and $ τy prot U .5 The rest of the proof assumes
we are in this case.
By assumption t12..n12 ff‹P t22..n22 , there is some point at which the traces become distinguishable. This can
happen for one of two reasons: one trace is a prefix of the other (up to extra ‚-equivalent terms), or there are
two non-‚ terms that are non-equivalent.
In the first case, without loss of generality assume t12..n12 is a prefix of t
22
..n22 . We claim that t
11
..n11 is a prefix
of t21..n21 . Lemma 6 ensures that any difference must come from a downgrade, which must be a declassifica-
tion because ENDORSE prohibits changing the confidentiality and P allows labels of any integrity. By the
argument in Theorem 3 this declassification event must be on trusted data, thus producing a public–trusted
output. Thus the condition that ti1..ni1´1 «‹T ti2..ni2´1 ensures that any declassifications appearing in t21..n21´1
appear identically in t11..n11´1, and similarly for t
22
..n22´1 and t
12
..n12´1. Since t
ij
nij ffW ‚, any public–untrusted
events appearing in t2j..n2j must also appear in t
1j
..n1j , and thus t
11
..n11 must be a prefix of t
21
..n21 .
For the second case—two non-‚ terms are non-equivalent—let n1i2 be the indices of the first such terms
in each trace. That is, ti2n1i2 ffP ‚ and t
12
n112
ffP t22n122 , but t
12
..n112´1 «
‹
P t
22
..n122´1. Again Lemma 6 ensures that
the first non-equivalence must be the result of a declassification that exists in both traces.
By construction n1ij ď nij and we have that t12..n112´1 «
‹
P t
22
..n122´1 by the definition of n
1
ij and t
i1
..ni1´1 «‹T
ti2..ni2´1 by assumption. Consequently, for all i, j, k, l P t1, 2u, we have
tij
..n1ij´1 «
‹
W t
kl
..n1kl´1.
In particular, this is true for t11 and t21. We also know that for all i, j P t1, 2u tij
n1ij
“ pÓÑ`1 , η` wijq for some
value wij .
We know that w12 ffP w22, and we now claim that w11 ffP w21. To emit this value, E-DECL must
have been applied, meaning there must have been a term pη`1 wijq in the preceding expression. Since such
expressions are not in the source language—they can only be created by applications of E-UNITM, E-
DECL, and E-ENDORSE—this expression must appear previously in each trace. We know that ` P P X T
and DECL requires that `1Ð “ `Ð, so therefore `1 P T . Since the prefixes prior to this event are trusted-
equivalent when varying only attacks, wi1 «T wi2 for i “ 1, 2. By assumption w12 ffP w22 and this is
the first difference in those traces. This means that if w11 «P w21 then w12 and w22 must have differed
only in untrusted public values nested inside the original declassification (i.e., w12 «‚ÑA w22). Therefore if
w11 «P w21, then v1, v2, and w2 are exactly the inputs needed in Definition 2 to demonstrate that w1 is an
irrelevant attack. We assumed that relÐA,epw1q, so w11 ffP w21 and therefore t11..n11 ff‹P t21..n21 , proving our
desired result.
5This technically reduces to the many-input version of the theorem that we prove is equivalent in Appendix C.
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